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SUMMARY 
A trade study has been conducted with the objective of providing a technical 
guideline for selection o f  the most appropriate computer technology for the Auto- 
matic Flight Control System of a civil subsonic jet transport. 
The trade study considers aspects of using either an analog, incremental type 
special purpose computer or a general purpose computer to perform critical autopilot 
computation functions. It also considers aspects of’ integration of non-critical 
autopilot and autothrottle modes into the computer performing the critical autoland 
functions, as compared to the federation of the non-critical modes into either a 
separate computer or with a R-Nav computer. 
associated with each of the computer configurations. 
The study is accomplished by establishing the relative advantages and/or risks 
INTRODUCTION 
To justify an investigation of the impact of introducing a new technology into 
an existing commercial field, two considerations must be ascertained: 
1. The motivation behind seeking new technology, and 
2. The real advantages to be gained by introducing a particular 
techno1 ogy. 
Automatic Flight Control systems of civil jet transports have reached the stage 
The purpose of this paper is to describe a method of conducting the background 
of seeking a newer electronic technology. Digital control systems are the candidates. 
trade studies to define the risks and advantages of a technological change. Although 
the application of the method is illustrated in terms of civil aircraft, the 
principles are basic and are applicable in many different areas of industry. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19760024069 2020-03-22T12:53:32+00:00Z
MOT1 VAT IONS 
The analog automatic flight control systems installed on civil jet transports 
represent significant contribution to the overall cost of development to the airframe 
manufacturer. In the most recent aircraft, the wide bodied jumbo jets, the automatic 
flight control systems (AFCS) accounted for development and certification monies 
ranglng from $10,000,000 to $30,000,000 (1969 to 1970 dollars). On the average, the 
production costs of the wide-bodied jets' AFCS are $300,000. 
ance figures show an annual maintenance cost of 1.54/$100 of initial system cost. 
That amounts to $4500 annually, or $90,000 over the normal life span of the aircraft. 
In general, such high costs have been incurred because of increased performance 
and safety requirements. A particular point is the general requirement for automatic 
landing systems, resulting in increased redundancy in the sensors, computers, and 
actuators of the AFCS. 
Cost of ownership has also become substantial , considering that airlines mainten- 
Technological advances in the analog art, in terms of computer architecture and 
electronic component packaging, have managed to keep costs under reasonable control. 
For example, considering only the AFCS electronics , a dual-pitch simplex monitored 
roll configuration of 1966 vintage costs the same as a total duplex pitch-roll system 
developed in 1969. This is in spite of the fact that the latter system has approx- 
imately 40% greater capabi 1 ity due to redundancy and increased operational requirements. 
analog state-of-the-art isn't sufficient to maintain an adequate margin against 
further total cost increase for future airplanes. 
the system technology from analog to digital to provide a more competitive condition 
in meeting yet higher performance and safety requirements. 
Substantial investigation and development has been conducted with digital flight 
control systems (DFCS). However, the accumulated data and conclusions are not 
directly transferable to civil transports because the greatest majority of the programs 
have been militarily oriented. The result is that the basic ground rules of develop- 
ment rely on calculated risk levels for safety, performance, and costs which could not 
be justified for commercial aircraft. 
of developing a commercial DFCS stumbles over the absence of hard trade data. 
"Absolute" data is available for analog systems because o f  comprehensive, empirical 
do's - dont's derived from past experience. 
feasible DFCS. 
A reasonable comparison - or trade study - methodology can be developed in the 
absence of "absolute" data by establishing a relative comparison referenced to a known 
quantity. In the present case, the known quantity is represented by an analog AFCS 
design in which there is a high level of confidence that it will comply with a sig- 
nificant requirement; the high level of confidence resulting from the absolute data 
embodied in established design techniques and practical experience. 
However, the situation doesn't appear to be stable. That is ,  advancement o f  
One possible solution is to change 
Therefore, any attempt to real istically judge the attendent risks and advantages 
Such data are not available for commercially 
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The reference system can then be arranged in terms of known risk parameters. A 
comparison of each risk parameter, individually with a counterpart parameter of a 
DFCS, can be conducted in a relative sense to determine the increment o f  risk incurred 
with the DFCS (a negative increment spotlights an advantage). In effect, a sort of 
chaln rule is established which allows evaluation of the newer technology system in 
known and understood terms of the older technology system. 
IDENTIFICATION OF REAL ADVANTAGES 
In order to arrange and select appropriate risk parameters, it is necessary to 
identify the risk points of the analog AFCS. A general survey of latest generation 
analog systems will result in the following conclusions: 
1. Computational Accuracy 
Operational amp1 ifier techniques have reduced computational tolerances to 
However, considering the total AFCS - i.e., sensors, levels between 2 and 5%. 
guidance signals, actuators, as well as the computers - further reduction of 
computational tolerances loses significance in view of the tolerances and 
inaccuracies of the sensors, guidance signals, etc. , which typically range 
between 8 and 20%. 
2. Reliability 
Design and packaging techniques have resulted in analog AFCS computers 
with mean time between failures of thousands of hours. Manufacturer 
warranties of 3000-4000 hours are not uncommon. However , with system-wide 
MTBF's of 200-300 hours, it can be seen that the computers' contribution to 
system railure rates is relatively insignificant. Therefore, substantial 
design activity to further increase computer reliability will not pay off 
proportionately in overall system reliability. 
function of the system owner's ability to maintain the system. 
vespect, analog systems have been shown by experience to be deficient. 
equipment. 
i tional circuitry dedicated to testing only. The increased complexity 
generated by BITE motivates the designer to restrict BITE to within the 
individual computer. System-wide tests are prohibitive. 
tenance activity - within the computer is relatively efficient (about 86% 
in the 747). 
Another aspect of system relaibility is its availability - a direct 
In this 
Build-in-test-equipment (BITE) is generally provided in all modern analog 
However, each test feature, being itself analog, requires add- 
The end result is that fault isolation - to indicate appropriate main- 
But the "system effectiveness", defined as 
CONFIRMED FAILURES 3 NENT REMOVALS 
ranges between 20 and 50%. 
actvities are inappropriate. 
Thus, more than half the owners maintenance 
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3. Redundancy Requirements 
Within the scope of commercial jet transports, existing and imminent, 
redundant systems have relatively little application outside of yaw damping 
(simple stability augmentation) and automatic landing. More exotic require- 
ments - flight critical modal suppression or control configured vehicles 
stability systems - are anticipated to be well beyond the next generation 
of civil aircraft. 
Consequently, analog technology has been successfully applied to 
existing redundancy requirements since 1966. 
4. General Cost Considerations 
Each new generation o f  aircraft is accompanied by a redesign of the 
analog AFCS. 
packaging techniques to maintain reliability and reduce costs. 
the AFCS is tailor-made. 
Invariably the redesign is necessary to incorporate newer 
In effect, 
Peripheral costs are induced by the tailoring. Test equipment, tech- 
nician training, etc., must be revised each time an airline re-equips. 
The general conclusions are that an effective comparison between a digital and 
analog AFCS must be parameterized to show substantial advantages in terms of system 
maintainability and costs. Structuring the trade to prove that a digital system is 
as good as an analog system, or to high-1 ight relatively insignificant advantages 
will not provide the supporting data necessary to introduce digital technology into 
commercial AFCS service. 
Therefore, selection of risk parameters associated with maintainability on a 
systems basis , and cost reduction (particularly through reasonable integration of 
system functions) will provide the most effective trade study. 
PRELIMINARY SELECTION OF CANDIDATE SYSTEMS 
Sys tems 
redundancy. 
organization 
initial'ly se 
can be examined under two aspects, viz, 1) organization, 2) level of 
These factors interact to some extent, but generally speaking, system 
is the more fundamental factor. Accordingly, candidate systems are 
ected by consideration of alternate system organizations. 
A variety of system organizations are available once the decision to employ 
digital technology has been made. Potential candidate systems range between the 
extremes of a central computer that performs all electronic computation, (total inte- 
gration) to a one-for-one replacement of analog LRU's (Line Replaceable Units) with 
digital LRU's. The number of potential system candidates must be reduced to make . 
detailed trade studies between alternate systems feasible. 
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The extremes, or limiting cases, in the type of system organization may be 
disposed of by general considerations, For example, the one-for-one replacement 
of analog computing LRU's by digital elements obviously negates the advantage of 
time shared digital computl'ng elements in addition to pro1 iferating 1/0 require- 
ments. 
authors' knowledge, it has never seriously been proposed as a viable digital flight 
control system and it is mentioned and disposed of here for the sake of logical 
completeness . 
Plainly, it offers no advantages in the present application. Indeed, to the 
The other limiting case - total integration, wherein a number of disparate 
computations such as air data, navigation, cruise autopilot, etc. , are performed 
in one computer - has been seriously proposed for a number of applications. 
certain aspects this is an attractive candidate. 
izatjon yields the minimum number of LRU's, minimizes interface complexity and 
slmplifies system test. 
inappropriate for the application under study. 
computations that would be performed in a central computer. Some of these com- 
putations are dispatch critical; i .e., the computations must be available if the 
airplane is to be dispatched. Air data computations are an example of computations 
that fall in this category. 
autoland are not necessary for dispatch. It i s  highly desirable from an airline 
point of view, that a "deferred maintenance" policy be employed to the extent poss- 
ible. That is, airlines desire to be able to defer maintenance action until such 
action is convenient from the standpoint of airplane schedule or location. The 
integration of dispatch critical and nondispatch critical functions in a common 
computer is not compatible with a deferred maintenance policy. Furthermore, reli- 
ability o f  the dispatch critical computations will suffer from piece part consid- 
erations alone. It should be noted that for some applications, such as an RPV, 
where all computations are required for mission success, total integration might be 
the logical choice for system organization. 
the limiting cases have been rejected. 
several candidates most promising for detailed trade studies is based on classifying 
the functions and assessing the redundancy requirements. These are shown in Table 1. 
Examination of Table 1 reveals that there are only two functions that are class- 
ified as flight critical; Category I11 Autoland and Yaw Damping. 
functions are accordingly assigned a fail-operational redundancy requirement. There 
is a significant difference in these two computations however, since the yaw damping 
function is assumed necessary for high altitude and high Mach number flight (normal 
cruise envelope). Therefore, an operational yaw damper is required for unrestricted 
dispatch. The redundancy requirement for this function results from the requirement 
to maintain artificial yaw damping until a speed-altitude reduction can be effected. 
that Category I11 conditions prevail; in addition, this function is not required for 
dispatch. The economic penalty for the nonavailability of the yaw damping function 
is consequently much more severe than the penalty for the nonavailability of Category 
I I I auto1 and. 
From 
Specifically, such a system organ- 
Nevertheless, this arrangement must also be rejected as 
The rejection is based on a consideration of the significance of various 
Other computations, such as cruise autopilot modes or 
There still remains a large number of potential candidate systems even after 
The rationale for further reduction to 
Both of these 
In contrast, the autoland function is flight critical only during those times 
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TABLE 1 
CATEGORY 111 
AUTOLAND 
AUTOTHROTTLE 
CRUISE AUTOPILOT 
MODES 
I FUNCTION 
FLIGHT CRITICAL FAIL OPERATIONAL 
NON-CRIT ICAL NONE 
NON-CRITICAL NONE 
CLASS IF I CAT I ON 
FLIGHT CRITICAL AT HIGH 
MACH ti ALTITUDE; REQUIRED 
FOR UNRESTRICTED DISPATCH 
REDUNDANCY I REQUIREMENT 
FA I L OPERAT I ONAL 
NAV I GAT I ON 
FLIGHT DIRECTOR 
I I 
1 
NON-CRITICAL NONE 
NON-CRITICAL NONE 
YAW DAMPER 
I I I I 
The remaining functions are seen to be classified as non-critical and similar in 
redundancy requirements. A logical candidate for further study is consequently 
obtained by structuring the system on the basis of a critical/non-critical division 
of functions. This results in a system wherein fail safe functions are performed in 
dual Nav/Flight Control computers and the flight critical autoland is performed in a 
triplex computer arrangement. In the following discussion this system structure is 
designated as a "Federated System". 
Another candidate system (Integrated System) is obtained by performing all auto- 
pilot and autothrottle functions, regardless of criticality, in a set of triply 
redundant computers and navigation functions in separate computers. 
Subsequent to 1980 this classification may change to dispatch critical with a 
minimum redundancy requirement of fail -op, but without a requirement for graceful 
degradation of capability after first failure. 
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Based on the previous discussion, three system configurations are developed 
(Figures 1 through 3 ) .  The analog computer arrangement in Figure 1 provides the 
"reference" for established technology. It should be noted that this particular 
arrangement shown i s  not presently in service. 
of system arrangement based on current requirements, and represents the level of 
technical risk acceptable if a change in electronic technology - to digital - were 
not also under consideration. 
o f ,  say, 1969, would insert a definite bias factor which could unrealistically 
effect the conclusions . ) 
Two types of di ita1 computer technology are considered: 
and Incremental (ICPS. The latter shares many of the characteristics of analog 
machines; accordingly, similar system architecture (Figure 1 ) i s  postulated for 
systems employing these machines. 
treat the analog and the incremental systems as synonymous except for software 
development and control. 
Rather, it is a logical evolution 
(To aftempt the trade study using systems technology 
General Purpose (GP) 
The similar characteristics make it possible to 
Application of the general purpose digital computers to the AFCS are illustrated 
in Figures 2 and 3 .  
evaluation of significant design considerations while minimizing unnecessary system 
variables. 
greatest feasible reduction of equipment and interface complexity. Figure 3 repre- 
sents a system arrangement which provides greatest possible isolation of flight 
critical modes to reduce the risks of failure modes compromising system safety re- 
quirements. 
These configurations were selected to provide comparative 
Figure 2 represents an integrated autopilot system which provides the 
The selection of these three candidate systems thus provides a means of eval- 
1. 
uating contrasting major design factors, that is: 
Direct evaluation of digital (General Purpose or Incremental) vs. analog 
technology by consideration of Figure 1 versus Figure 3; 
Direct evaluation of the impact of substantial integration by consideration 
of Figure 2 versus Figure 3 ;  and 
Direct evaluation of maximum feasible benefits of the digital approach 
by consideration of Figure 1 versus Figure 2. 
2. 
3 .  
After selecting the basic candidate systems, major variations within a system 
configuration may also be considered, as shown by comparing the federated DFCS illus- 
traded in Figures 3 and 4. 
band of merit in the eventual study results. 
o f  further assessing the sensitivity of system risks/advantage to configuration. 
The effect of including variations will be to provide a 
Such a band of merit provides a means 
TRADE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The identification of key parameters is fundamental in conducting trade studies. 
Two sets of parameters were identified to evaluate the alternate systems, viz: 
"System Parameters" and "Trade Parameters". 
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Trade Parameters were selected to use as a basis of comparison between major 
features of each system. The major features were designated as System Parameters. 
Trade Parameters are weighted according to a Relative Advantage/Risk Factor rationale. 
System Parameters are weighted in accordance with their relative importance to the 
overall makeup of the system. System Parameters along with their weighting (relative 
importance factors) are given in Table 11. 
TABLE I1 
Software Development, Verification 
and Control 
1/0 Equipment 
System Test 
Sensor Signal Selection and Fault Detection 
Mode Logic and Interlocks 
Interties 
Processor 81 Memory Sizing 
Control Law Implementation 
\ 
Trade Parameters are defined as follows: 
Reliability The impact which the System Parameter under consid- 
eration has on the system integrity, operational 
availability and ability to meet safety requirements 
(autoland and dispatch critical functions). 
Testability The requirements imposed on system test in terms of  
hardware/software by the System Parameter being 
evaluated . 
Moni torabi 1 i ty The requirements (in terms of hardware, software and 
engineering development) to provide failure detection 
for those elements of the System Parameter being 
evaluated . 
The impact on system fault isolation to the LRU 
1 eve1 . Maintainabi 1 i ty 
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Growth Capability The abi l i ty  of the particular parameter to  
accomodate growth due to  expanded sys tem require- 
ments , or improvements. 
cost The impact o f  the parameter on system cost i n  terms 
o f  hardware requirements and/or engineering develop- 
ment cost. 
Trade Parameter weightings are given i n  Table 111. 
TABLE I11 
RELATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Definite Advantage 
Probable Advantage 
No Advantage 
RELATIVE RISK 
No Risk 
Minor Risk 
Moderate Risk 
Severe Risk 
WEIGHTING FACTOR 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
-2 
-3 
I t  will be noted that the weighting system i s  balanced a t  "definite 
advantage" vs. "moderate risk". Hence, a severe risk will negatively 
influence a definite advantage making i t  less desirable. 
Detailed definition of the descriptive terms of Table I11 are given i n  
Table IV. 
The manner i n  which the System Parameter/Trade Parameter weighting factors are 
combined is  shown schematically i n  Figure 5. A comparison across the systems under 
s tudy,  for  a given System Parameter i s  used t o  select the Advantage/Risk weighting 
factor or score. 
Advantage/Risk score. 
influences. First, a careful choice of System Parameters will isolate the most 
significant aspects of the system structure; likewise the choice of Trade Para- 
meters displays those features or system characteristics that are regarded as 
significant i n  choosing between competing systems. T h u s  on this level, t ac i t  
assumptions are either exposed or rendered nugatory. Secondly, the Advantage/Risk 
scores are selected only after detailed comparative studies of the System Parameters 
under the aspect o f  the Trade Parameters are made. Aqain, this procedure works t o  
minimize the influence o f  subjective factors. In addition, the procedure isolates 
any relatively h i g h  risk items i n  the system configuration t h a t  is finally selected 
Engineering judgement enters, o f  course, i n t o  selecting the 
However, two factors work to minimize purely subjective 
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and consequently it serves to focus design efforts on critical items. 
the Appendix. 
A typical example of this procedure taken from a recent trade study is given in 
STUDY RESULTS 
Application of the above methodology to the systems of Figures 1, 2,  3,  and 4 
yields the data of Figure 6. 
various system parameters gives the following overall figure of merit for the systems 
shown in Figure 7. 
negative overall ralative rating. The lack of relative advantages for these systems 
are a function of the nature of the computers. 
part of the automatic flight control system tasks, namely control law calculations. 
The remainder of the tasks - self tests, mode logic, etc. - must be performed by 
additional, external means. 
Summing the weighted rating of this figure for the 
The choice of an analog or incremental system is not warranted because of the 
Specifically, they perform only a 
The figure of merit indicates that the integrated system has the greatest overall 
potential. 
displayed in Figure 6, it can be seen that a potentially high level of risk is 
associated with software development and control. 
major follow-on effort is necessary to resolve the issue and reduce the risk. 
However, by reviewing the results for each of the system parameters as 
This clearly indicates that a 
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UNCLASSIFIED RISK OR ADVANTAGES 
Certain aspects are important in the final selection of a system which are 
not readily uantifiable, such as vendor support, commonality of equipment, customer 
choices, ARI l C implications, or organizational aspects. The fact that the ICP 
computer is available from a single source would seem to be a risk with regards to 
the above consideration since by selecting that architecture one would effectively 
select the supplier. Customer choices and ARINC implications tend to increase the 
risk incurred by including the non-critical autopilot and autothrottle functions in 
the R-NAV computer. 
customer by reducing his maintenance and possibly inventory costs. 
Commonality in the various computers used in the airplane would benefit the 
The advances in the digital computer hardware state-of-the-art, through large 
scale integration and improved semi-conductor devices , reduces cost while increasing 
computational capacity as well as increasing predicted reliability by reducing the 
number of interconnections within the computer. However, there is the risk incurred 
in the early stages of appllcation of new technology. 
Failure modes effect and criticality analyses (FNECA) present an area of severe 
risk for digital systems. 
the FMECA and the probable success achievable. Results of the studies done in the 
"DOT/SST follow-on" program indicate that any attempt at a FMECA according to the 
traditional approach may be a gargantuan task even with computer aided evaluations. 
Similarly, contact with vendors have not revealed any clear methodology for performing 
a thorough FMECA of digital computers. 
Further study is required to assess the FMECA bounds that must be attained to 
meet certification requirements with a digital autopilot. 
The FMECA risk may be alleviated by system design such that the safety is 
assured by "isolated" simple monitoring devices which are amenable t o  a thorough 
FMECA. 
The risk is in terms of assessing the effort required to do 
With regards to the relative comparison of the ICP and GP computers there is 
no appreciable difference in the FMECA risk. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Interpretation of the results of a "relative merit" trade study - such as pre- 
viously described - can be made only within the frameowrk of level of confidence. 
system configuration which rates relatively lower than another cannot be concluded as 
infeasible. 
the confidence associated with the higher rates system. 
The results of a relative merit trade study, carefully performed, can provide 
quantified conclusions which clearly indicate the best engineering solution for the 
system architecture. Also, weakness of the chosen system are identified in such a 
One 
Rather, the confidence of achieving the desired advantages is less than 
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manner as to indicate the degree of urgency for follow-on engineering efforts to 
reinforce the weak points. 
established technology), reasonable predictions can be formed i n  terms of the actual 
engineering effort required to introduce the newer technology. 
Having made relative comparisons against a known quantity (in this case, the 
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APPENDIX 
The following considerations are typical of the judgement required to assess 
the risk or advantage increments between candidate systems for a given parameter. 
The system parameter discussed in this appendix is tvDical of the various 
parameters which must all be considered to complete the study. 
described in this paper, there were eight major parameters identified. 
For the example 
I. TNPUT/OUTPUT STAGE 
GENERAL NOTES 
1. General Purpose Computer Configurations 
All interfaces for incoming and outgoing signals are accomplished 
within the 1/0 stage. 
Incoming signals are individually conditioned in dedicated signal- 
conditioning circuits. Two multiplexing units are required, one each 
for critical and non-critical analog signals. The output of each MUX 
goes through common time gating circuits and a single A/D converter, then 
into a para1 1 el -1 oad/serial -output buffer register . 
Digital inputs are loaded into their respective buffer registers 
preparatory to being gated into the computer memory for storage, 
converter buffer register, and the digital input buffer registers are 
gated as serial data into the computer by a common gating circuit. 
critical and non-critical signals. Common circuitry is always downstream 
of adequate buffering. 
The output signals generated by the computer are treated in a similar 
fashion, i.e., a single D/A conversion followed by individual signal 
conditioning as required. 
The A/D 
This arrangement is necessary to allow card-level isolation between 
Servo amplifiers for elevator and aileron position servos are included 
as part of the 1/0 stage. 
The high speed yaw dampers are independent analog systems comprising 
control law calculation, engage and disengage control , and servo loop 
electronics in a ackage separate from the AFCS computer. However, low 
speed (flaps down 7 yaw damping is augmented by turn coordination and yaw 
damping control generated within the AFCS computer. Channels A and B 
provide the upper and lower yaw damper augmentation respectively. 
C ' s  augmentation may be used for monitoring purposes and as a switchable 
hot-spare for either, upper or lower yaw damper. 
Channel 
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1. General Purpose Computer Configurations (continued) 
The 1/0 stage also includes an interface between the generated auto- 
throttle commands and the autothrottle (dual) servos. 
arrangement to the yaw damper augmentation signals, channel C serves as 
a monitoring function and switchable hot spare for autothrottle 
In a similar 
2. Analog Computer Configuration 
Note 1, with the following exceptions: 
The description of the analog "I/O" essentially follows that'given in 
a. Obvious deletion of MUX requirements. 
b. "Brickwall" configuration, i .e. , federated configuration does not 
include interface mixing of critical and non-critical signals. Only 
critical signals are routed into the analog computer. 
c. 
as illustrated in Figure 1. 
All yaw damping functions are eliminated from the analog computer 
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